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NCALJ Panel Discussion:

ALJ Decisions - Final or

Fallible?
I. DISCUSSION INFORMATION

Panel Participants:
Professor Jim Flanagan, Oliver Ellsworth Professor of Federal
Practice, University of South Carolina
Professor Jim Rossi, Harry M. Walborsky Professor and Associate
Dean for Research, Florida State University College of Law
HonorableJohn Hardwicke, Executive Director, NAALJ
Moderator:
Honorable Tyrone T. Butler, Chief Administrative Law Judge,
District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings and
President-Elect, NAALJ
Date and Location:
Friday, August 6, 2004
Georgia Office of State Administrative Hearings, Atlanta, Georgia
II. DIscusSION
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: I'm very pleased and happy to be
here. For an academic, it's extremely important to have the
opportunity to test the ideas we have in the crucible of reality, and
this obviously is one of those times.
Now, let me define the terms. AU finality, in the sense that I
talk about, is the ability of the administrative law judge to make a
decision that is final for all purposes, subject only to review by the
judiciary. ALJ finality occurs two ways. In some states, for example
South Carolina and Louisiana, by statute the ALJ makes the final
decision and it is appealable to the courts. In other jurisdictions, the
AU's fact-finding is de facto final because the agency's ability to
change a finding is very limited. North Carolina has de facto finality.
If the agency alters the AU's decision in any way during agency
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review, the disputed issue may be appealed to a trial court judge, who
then decides the issue de novo.
The net effect is that it is very difficult for the agency to reverse
agencies on findings of fact. By the way, I'm not suggesting that the
traditional deference that ALJs are accorded on credibility
determinations should be limited in any way. That makes a lot of
sense. But when it is difficult or impossible for the agencies to
review and modify a decision, there are problems. There are three or
four major difficulties. One is that there will be inconsistent
determinations on critical issues between the agency's view on a
particular matter and what any administrative law judge decides.
Since the administrative law judges are a trial bench, and there is no
mechanism to reconcile the decisions of the various administrative
law judges, there will be inconsistencies between ALJs on particular
issues. There is evidence that these inconsistencies occur. There is
some indication of this in the litigation in Louisiana involving its
central panel. There are also inconsistencies in the federal system,
when adjudication is separated from the agency under the split
enforcement system.
This means that there is a significant problem of consistency in
enforcement by the agencies, because the question will be, whose
view is going to be the dominant, the agency's or the AU's? Those
inconsistencies will lead to more litigation which, I believe,
undermines the regulatory effort of the agencies.
I also think that it is likely to lead to a loss of expertise in
analysis. The AUs make final decisions based upon the information
that is available to them. To the extent that the agency has
institutional experience, it will be lost if there is no agency review.
Now, my view is that agencies should be able to review AU
decisions, and in appropriate cases, consistent with the substantive
law, be able to modify findings. I don't believe agency review is a
criticism of what administrative law judges do. They have a very
important, if not central, role. They certainly are responsible for
ensuring procedural due process. They are certainly responsible for
making an adequate record and an adequate basis for the decision.
And certainly whatever fact-finding or judgments they make on
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credibility are entitled to deference. They have an opportunity to
identify circumstances where the existing law or policy should be
changed. But I do believe that the agencies should have significant
power to review and alter or amend those decisions under the law.
Agency review has been a fundamental premise of administrative
law, certainly since the passage of the federal APA, and I don't think
that the ALJ, as an expert in procedural regularity, necessarily has the
expertise to make those final decisions.
I'm going to suggest three issues that are emerging in the debate
about AU finality. First, I want to be clear that the question of AU
finality is absolutely independent of the question of whether or not
central panels are an effective administrative procedure and device.
There is absolutely no doubt that central panels are appropriate. My
concern is only about AU finality.
One of the things that I am concerned about is that on reading the
literature on central panels, it's hard to find any favorable word about
the agencies' role in adjudication. Now, I'm not suggesting that
there aren't problems with agencies. But what I am suggesting is that
there is a perception in the literature that agencies don't do anything
right. And that raises, a significant concern. The agency is
responsible for implementing and enforcing a statutory set of
procedures. Those laws and regulations have been authorized by the
legislature, and they represent significant values in the community.
To the extent that there is an emphasis solely on the rights of the
applicants or contestants in front of the administrative law judges,
and the perception that agencies don't do anything right, we may run
the risk of a distorted view of administrative adjudication.
The other question that I raise about AU finality is the
consequence that it may have for the ALJs themselves. One of the
disadvantages of AU finality is the loss of political accountability.
Agencies are responsible for the enforcement scheme and they are
politically accountable. That political accountability is going to go
somewhere, and in those states where there is significant AU
finality, some sort of political pressure is going to be exerted on
administrative law judges.
Thank you.
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HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Thank you, Professor Flanagan.
Professor Rossi?
PROFESSOR JIM ROSSI: I agree with a lot of what Professor
Jim Flanagan has to say about the nature of finality in administrative
law, particularly the impact that it might have on accountability in the
administrative process. And, like Jim, I'm no fan of automatically
granting AU decisions final status. I would emphasize that what
we're talking about here is legal finality. To a degree, we are also
talking about de facto finality - that ALJ decisions are frequently
final because an agency with the authority to accept or modify ALJ
findings does not do so - but I'm going to focus most of my remarks
today on the legal finality of ALJ decisions, or when an agency does
not have authority to reject or modify ALJ findings.
In my opinion, the state central panel concept allows ALJs to
provide an efficient and independent adjudication forum, without
making every AJ decision final. And, as I'm going to suggest, I
think there is little to be gained for administrative process values
from ALJ finality. However, as someone who lives in a state which
makes many AL decisions final - in Florida for instance, ruled
validity challenges are heard by administrative law judges and they
make final decisions in those contexts - I recognize that AL finality
is a feature in many states' systems of administrative law. States like
Louisiana, South Carolina, and many other states have adopted ALJ
finality in certain contexts. And it's a feature within these state
systems of administrative governance, perhaps even a permanent one.
If Jim is correct, and I think he is, we have to contain the spread of
finality. But where ALJ finality is already a feature of state
administrative law, how should agencies and courts react to it?
What I want to focus on is what courts ought to do in states where
ALJ finality already exists. What are the implications of finality for
those systems of administrative law generally and for judicial review
in particular? And what I want to emphasize is accountability is not
some abstract value that we're pulling out of a hat in discussing
administrative law. In fact, administrative law - and particularly
doctrines of judicial review - are designed with a certain
accountability structure, a decision-making structure, in mind. I want

Spring 2005

NCALJ Panel Discussion: ALJ Decisions - Final or Fallible?

195

to suggest that ALJ finality of the legal sort is not really compatible
with that accountability structure. So, to that extent, states that have
adopted ALJ finality, courts in those states must also adjust their
approach to judicial review of ALJ decisions if they are to protect
accountability. And I can distill my comments of today to two
distinct and hopefully very brief steps. First, echoing Jim, I want to
describe some institutional models of adjudication in order to focus
discussion and to trace how finality can and should be disentangled
from the central panel. And then, what I want to do is to flag how
finality might have serious implications for judicial review,
especially on issues of law and policy, and suggest what courts might
be able to do about this, to the extent that state APAs allow it.
Now, in the materials that have been distributed and on the screen
at the front of the room, I am presenting a figure that includes three
models of agency adjudication which might lead to judicial review.
These come from page fifty-six of the article in the materials that
have been distributed.' The models are also drawn from an earlier
article written by Professor William Anderson at the University of
Washington. 2
If you focus on Model One, Model One sees the investigative and
prosecutorial, the initial judgment and the final decision stages of
adjudication, as internal to a single administrative agency. An ALJ
may make a decision, but this decision occurs within the
administrative agency itself. The ALJ issues a recommended
decision, which the agency may accept or reject before an agency
decision becomes final and appealable to a reviewing court. This is
the model that predominates at the federal level and in many states
that don't have central panels.

1. Jim Rossi, Final, But Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with ALJ

Finality, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 53, 56 (2004). This is an expanded and updated
version of Jim Rossi, AL] Final Orders on Appeal: Balancing Independence With
Accountability, 19 J.NAALJ 1 (1999).
2. William R. Anderson, Judicial Review of State Administrative Action Designing the Statutory Framework,44 ADMIN. L. REv. 523, 555 (1992).
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Model Two sees the investigative and prosecutorial decisions as
occurring in a separate institutional entity, the administrative agency,
then adjudication, which occurs typically in some sort of a central
panel. This is the traditional central panel model. As we know, the
central panel has some real advantages over Model One, efficiency
among them, since, in many states, agencies cannot afford their own
AUs, let alone the internal safeguards and institutional constraint
that they would need to place on them. Second, this ensures
independence to the extent there is an institutional wall of separation,
between the investigator and the prosecutor on the one hand, and the
judge on the other, to protect fairness in the decision-making process.
Note, however, that under Model Two, as in the federal system, the
AU's decision is a recommendation. Of course, if the parties to a
proceeding, including the agency, fail to exhaust remedies, the AU
decision may become final, but exhaustion and finality are two
different things. Normally, an AU decision must go through the
agency head, who may or may not take action on it before a final and
appealable decision occurs. This is the standard central panel model.
Most states with central panels adhere to some variant of it. And it's
the concept in the 1960 and 1981 MSAPAs, and will likely be the
model for the upcoming MSAPA revision as well.
Now, Model Three is fundamentally different. Model Three
separates entirely the AU and agency decisions. Here, the agency,
not the AU, makes the recommended decision. The AU may make
an entirely contrary decision. If the AU does so, this is immediately
appealable as a final agency act or final action, without any
opportunity for agency review of the AL's decision. In other words,
here exhaustion is meaningless. The agency has basically relegated
the status of any other party on appeal that files briefs before the
court outlining why its position, rather than the AU, should prevail,
to the extent they disagree. But the AUJ's decision becomes the
status quo, which a reviewing court considers.
As Jim has suggested, the central panel can and should be
disentangled from AU finality. For example, I think that all
discussion of administrative law before NCCUSL, which is currently
working on a new MSAPA project, has had Model One and Model
Two in mind as background concepts. Under both of these models,
the agency head has the power to make a decision that is immediately
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appealable to the court. We're all taught administrative law with this
model in mind - even those of us who studied state administrative
law. And I think this is one reason why the distinction between
exhaustion and finality is so important to administrative law and the
administrative process.
Now I want to run my attention to the types of judicial review
administrative law might afford final decisions made by ALJs.
Administrative Law has designed its primary standards of review
with Model One and Model Two in mind, not Model Three.
Generally, under state APAs, reviewing courts apply somewhat
deferential standards of review, such as substantial evidence and
arbitrary and capricious. Judicial deference has a role in this context
because of the assumption that a politically accountable and expert
agency decision-maker has some authority to accept or reject final
adjudication of decisions. For example, under normal standards of
judicial deference to agency interpretations of law, courts do not
upset agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. Also,
in reviewing complex, technical agency policy decisions, a reviewing
court normally does not generally substitute its judgment for the
agency decision-maker. Instead, to promote expertise in the agency
decision-making process, the commonly accepted role of courts, in
reviewing both issues of law and policy, is one of deference.
Although the label a court places on the standard of review certainly
varies from state to state, the general attitude is consistently one of
deference in those state systems.
The main rationales for deference by courts are premised on an
administrative agency, which is politically accountable and possesses
expertise for the decision that's being reviewed, having authority to
make a decision. If, however, a state AU has made a legally final
decision that is subject to review, this presents a problem for
reviewing courts. If a final AU decision is contrary to the agency's
initial decision, and the agency contests it, the AU decision subject
to review before a court should not necessarily be afforded the same
level of deference as an agency decision. The ALJ, of course, is a
generalist adjudicator who can protect procedural fairness and is very
adept at doing that, as well as adept at making credibility
determinations - much like a trial court judge. But the administrative
agency is comprised of specialists who are also more directly
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politically accountable to elected officials; they will have an
institutional advantage in making law and policy determinations.
ALJ findings of fact present little or no problem under an
adjudication system that affords ALJ decisions final status, and the
substantial evidence test needs no medication in this context.
However, at a minimum, I think that on appeal of final AU
decisions, courts would need to give great weight to the legal and
policy decisions presented by agencies and appellate briefs on issues
of law and policy. Perhaps they should even subject AU decisions
to a standard of review akin to what they afford trial court decisions
on issue of law - clearly erroneous or de novo - rather than
deferential review.
Briefly, I want to wrap up and save some of my additional
remarks about standards of review for rebuttal. But, in sum, if we
take finality to its extreme, we begin to treat AU decisions in a
manner similar to a trial court judge. At some level, we might
question whether this is compatible then to the values of
administrative law. We learn administrative law with Models One
and Two of agency adjudication in mind. To the extent that they
allow accountability and independence to co-exist, they strike a
balance. To the extent that administrative law is compatible with
ALJ finality, and I'm not sure it is, there are some issues regarding
what standard of review courts should apply to an AU final order
that should be on the table for discussion. I think AU finality
presents some accountability defects. These defects require us to pay
At a
attention to standards of review of final ALJ decisions.
minimum, I think that to the extent AUs and central panels want the
sweet of AU finality, they might have to take some bitter as well
with this, which would be decreased judicial deference to AU
decision-making outside of issues of fact.
Thank you.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Thank you, Sir.
John?
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JUDGE HARDWICKE: Mr. Moderator, I hope you will note
that I only have ten minutes to rebut the twenty minute argument of
the Professors, and my ten minutes may not suffice.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Judge Hardwicke, I'm moderating
and keeping the time, also.
JUDGE HARDWICKE: My friends, the Professors, are trained
so much in federal administrative law that I think that they lose track
of the differences between state administrative law and federal
administrative law. Everybody in this room is familiar with Chevron
USA v. the Natural Resources Defense Council, which gives great
deference to agency interpretation of ambiguous statutes. Chevron
has been cited over 11,000 times in the literature and in law reviews
3,652 times. Typical of state citations, Chevron has never been cited
in an appellate decision in South Carolina, once by an appellate court
in Maryland, and once in an appellate decision in Georgia. Bearing
in mind that Chevron was decided more than twenty years ago.
Now, to show the contrasting state interest in due process,
consider widespread citations among the states of Matthews v.
Eldredge, a 1976 case, cited 8,885 times and over 500 times in state
courts. In other words, due process questions receive great attention
in state courts, whereas federal statutory interpretation receives little
or none.

Academics, with specialties in federal administrative law, I
believe, misconstrue the nature of the central panel movement and
the nature of state agencies. The state administrative function is
more programmatic, and different programs may be loosely assigned
to agencies, or not assigned at all. Consequently, a program may not
be identified with an express mission or policy.
In Maryland, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) hears
over 600 different programs assigned to more than twenty agencies.
The State Health Department alone provides hearings for more than
100 programs. There may be no such thing as a general policy
position within many state agencies. This may or may not be true of
the federal system where agencies are more monolithic with fewer
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individualized programs - but with well-defined policy prerogatives
for major mission assignments.
Professors Flanagan and Rossi fail to mention the American Bar
Association's model OAH statute, which provides a menu for agency
protection of its policy. In any given case, or class of cases, the
agency may actually retain a case, or class of cases, for policy
considerations, or send that case or class of cases to the OAH for
either a recommended or final decision. Professor Rossi seems not to
recognize that so called de jure delegations of final authority may
actually be voluntary agency assignments to central panels within the
menu concept. There is no truly granite approach to final decisional
responsibility among the states.
What is called agency expertise is not so much agency expertise
as it is agency culture. It has been written that agency expertise
should be "on tap" but not "on top." The head of the agency is
generally not an expert, but relies upon the expertise of economists,
lawyers, and other professionals employed on his or her staff.
Generally, state agency heads and commissions are chosen for
political reasons by Governors and they have the experts in their
staff.
Agency expertise in support of agency decisions is placed upon
the table at the hearing qui audit decidet. He who hears decides, is
the key principle of our life and our law. To defer the final decision
back to the agency is, in effect, to give the agency a second bite at the
apple. In the central panel system and similar systems that we're
familiar with, adjudicatorial process is adversarial. If the agency
head gets a second bite, and if for any reason he or she is able to
change the decision of the hearing judge under the rubric of "policy,"
disagreeable results will be modified. Consequently, many states
have placed a statutory limitation upon the agency's ability to
overrule the judge except for limited specific reasons. Our academic
friends treat these limitations as de facto finality.
The truth of the matter is that we are trying to prevent the agency
head from overturning the decision with which he or she disagrees.
Neither the agency nor the respondent may be agreeable losers;
indeed the agency may believe that the action would not have been
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pursued at all without justification. Consequently, when the agency
loses, it may find reasons, or attempt to find reasons, policy reasons
or whatever, for reversing.
As I have said, agency expertise is a derivative from agency
culture; the agency head or the in-house hearing officer may be
embedded in that culture which few members of the affected public
can understand. It is only by taking the hearing responsibility away
from the agency, and away from agency culture, that we can be
assured of fair play. The ancient Greeks created the concept of
"isonomy," equality through the law, recognizing that government
action should take place in a citizen friendly culture in order to
provide a balanced decision-making environment.
So what we have done in the central panel setup is to make the
hearing the name of the game. Agency policy, as well as the
agency's expertise, is put on the table at the hearing through its staff
of experts. Agency policy is part of the law of the case and part of
the assignment of the judge to apply in a given case. Consequently,
the hearing, the centerpiece of all of the work, and the record of the
hearing, is the final matter. Professor Flanagan argues that finality
derived from AU decision-making results in lack of uniformity and
hence lack of predictability of administrative decision-making. In
most states the present system of appeal to circuit courts surely gives
rise to lack of uniformity. And many times the agency will make
sure that the appeal goes to the circuit court likely to be friendly to its
position.
And one final word. When I established the Maryland system, I
met with the Motor Vehicle Commissioner to urge that the OAH be
delegated final decision-making power. During the meeting, he
excused himself for a telephone call. Upon his return, he indicated
that the call came from a Senator attorney making inquiry about a
hearing. The Commissioner ultimately assigned finality of decisions
to the new OAH. Clearly, fairness trumps expertise.
Thank you.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER:
Hardwicke.

Thank you very much, Judge
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We'll have rebuttal now, or rejoinder.
Professor Flanagan?
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: First, we have to get a handle on
how often agencies disagree with ALJs. In the state system, that is
difficult to determine. My guess, from looking at several reports,
including Professor Daye's case study from North Carolina, suggests
that agencies accept, on review, at least eighty percent of decisions
It's likely that, excluding
by ALJs without any changes.
disagreements over the penalty, that the agreement between agencies
and ALJs is in the neighborhood of ninety percent. Arizona, which
has very good statistics, says that agencies and ALJs agree ninety
percent of the time and ninety-five percent of the time if you exclude
penalty issues. So, there is very high agreement between agencies
and ALJs.
The second thing that I suggest is that in many cases the
information, particularly in complex cases, increases over time.
South Carolina, for example, has certificate of need cases, and Chief
Judge Kittrell has heard several of them. The information that is
presented to the agency on whether a certificate of need is
appropriate may come on January 1, let's say, and the agency makes
its initial decision. A year later, there may be a hearing before the
administrative law judge and another party; typically a competing
institution introduces additional evidence on the issue. In other
words, what was presented to the agency when it made the initial
decision is not the same information that is presented to the
administrative law judge. My view is that with appropriate findings
of fact based on a much fuller record, there is really a second
opportunity to make a decision on more complete information. And
the primary purpose of agency review is to be able to look at all the
information after it has been presented to the AU.
So, the rate of agreement between AU and agency is high. The
level of disagreement is not significant enough to go justify a change
in agency review. Second, because information increases through the
hearing process, agency review after a full hearing is important. And
I believe this is true in the state system as well as the federal system.
I don't think there is significant difference on this point.
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HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Thank you.
Professor Rossi?
PROFESSOR ROSSI: Having taught both federal and state
administrative law, and done so in a variety of states, I am aware of
what many states do in the coiitext of judicial review. Some states,
of course, have an independent standard of review even in reviewing
agency law and policy decisions. Most states though, I think it's fair
to say, endorse a standard of review that affords some deference to
law and policy decisions. Although few states adhere to Chevron
explicitly, "some deference" or "great weight" are routine phrases
uttered by state courts in reviewing agency interpretations of law.
I'm not aware of any state court cases that clearly say that ALJ legal
and policy determinations are reviewed in the same manner. So
when I'm referring to "principles of administrative law," I am
referring to principles of state administrative law, as well as
consistent principles with federal administrative law, in this context.
I think that what Judge Hardwicke says about finality in the
context of factual decisions makes a lot of sense in the context where
the ALJ's ability to adjudge credibility is institutionally superior to
the agency's - the DMV context in Maryland seems to me a good
example of where an agency might voluntarily select to assign AJ
finality to a pool or a class of cases. That makes sense to me,
especially in the context of certain factual adjudicative
determinations.
Where I think I have the most problem, though, is in the context
of ALJ final determination on issues of law and policy, especially on
complex and controversial regulatory matters. Again, I ask the
questions: How is this consistent with the values of accountability in
the administrative state, in the sense of both politically and expertbased notions of accountability? How is it consistent with a statebased administrative process that values accountable, as well as fair
and procedurally just, decisions?
Thank you.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Thank you.
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Judge Hardwicke?
JUDGE HARDWICKE: I think Professor Rossi really touched
upon the point, which is one of policy. According to various chief
judges of the central panel states with whom I have discussed final
decision-making, there is unanimity that they have not sought that
authority. However, when agencies have voluntarily relinquished
this finality to central panels, it has been welcomed as a sign of
approval of the competence of the delegated hearing process. In
other words, they consider that as a mark of approbation.
I do agree with Professor Flanagan that the incidence or
coincidence of agreement with the agency decision is remarkably
high when finality of decision is attained. Thus, when we achieved
DMVA responsibility for drunk driving cases in Maryland, DMVA
records proved that for over a period of years OAH decisions were
compatible with agency decisions eighty-seven or eighty-eight
percent of the time.
I have referred to the fact that agencies are, or may be, immersed
in their own specialized culture, and that this culture is sometimes
assumed to be the same as expertise. But, culture problems have yet
another aspect in non-panel states where there may be a coziness,
even marriage, by the agency to regulated businesses or interest
groups. A state insurance agency charged with the regulation of the
insurance industry, may become a protector of that industry.
Commission authorities may become familiar with regulated officials
and with their lawyers, creating a vulnerability to pressure. A citizen
litigant may find himself confronted by a commonality of jargon, a
patois, spoken only in the world of specialization.
We have a long way to go in the central panel system. I think we
need some great improvement in both hearing technique and better
mastery of jurisprudence. We need a certification program for ALJs,
so that ALJs will be more uniformly capable and demonstrably
qualified. We need to work more cooperatively with agencies, to
attend public meetings with agency heads to discuss their policies with such meetings attended by the public and by the Bar. Closer
attention should be paid to the ABA model OAH statute by those
states considering a central panel so that recommended versus final
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decisions can be decided by a menu of agency choices. State
administrative procedure acts should be amended better to reflect
We must continue
modem central panel jurisprudence.
conscientiously to improve.
Thank you.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Now we'll address some of these
questions. I will tell you that penmanship counts. So if your name
isn't on here, I may have to as you to kind of like straighten this out.
Professor Oakley, where are you? Your question: Should courts
give more deference to findings/conclusions of ALJs than AUs'
policy function in levying civil fines? Is that your question?
PROFESSOR OAKLEY: Yes.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Okay, and I'll ask Professor Rossi to
address that.
PROFESSOR ROSSI: If you'll allow me I'd like to reframe the
question here: Should courts give AUs more deference on general
factual decisions and conclusions as opposed to policy decisions to
levy fines. You know, I think it depends on the nature of the findings
and conclusions. To some degree, the findings and conclusions could
well be imbued with all sorts of policy determinations - so called
"mixed" questions - including legal interpretations of the agency's
regulatory programs and the agency's regulations. To the extent they
are, I am not sure that if they are final AU decisions that they ought
to be given the same amount of deference as purely factual issues. If,
however, those findings and conclusions are more around a pure
factual issue, deference may be appropriate by a reviewing court
under the substantial evidence standard.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Judge Hardwicke, would you care to
comment on that?
JUDGE HARDWICKE: I think sometimes the amount of
deference is subject-matter driven. I heard your comment, Professor
Rossi, about the amount of deference that's given by the various state
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agencies to state ALJs. In Maryland, our courts give super deference
in the judicial review of decisions of the Public Service Commission
and of the State Board of Public Education, ostensibly because of
their special expertise. However, statutory mandates for both boards
indicate that they are comprised of ordinary citizens without any
specially defined qualifications.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Do you want to weigh in, Professor
Flanagan?
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: No.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Well, the next question is addressed
to you, anyway. It's regarding the inconsistency of AU decisions.
Is there empirical data supporting your conclusion that there [are]
these inconsistencies, and are inconsistent decisions more likely from
boards, commissions and agencies that are chosen and change for
political reasons?
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: It is hard to find information on
inconsistencies between ALJs and agencies. It's hard to find
statistical support. What you have to do is look at all the cases and
see what each AU decides and make judgments on how they differ.
What is clear is that any time there is ALJ finality, you will find that
different AUs decide the same question differently.
So
inconsistencies occur. There's no doubt about that.
I'm sorry, what was the second part of that question?
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Are inconsistent decisions more
likely from boards, commissions, and agencies that are chosen, I
guess politically chosen, and change for political reasons?
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: Well, this brings up the idea of
political accountability.
We elect officials, and officials are
appointed, because they represent various political views. The whole
purpose of the elections that we are now going through is that they
may change the officials in the federal system. So the fact that an
agency decides something one day and there are different leaders
later on who make different decisions, is a function of democracy.
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But I believe that the same board or commission is likely to decide
the same issue the same way, if they are the same decision-makers,
more consistently than when there is a large central panel with
several ALJs who hear the cases from the same agency.
JUDGE SCHOENBAUM: May I ask a follow-up to the first half
of that question?
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: No. (Laughter)
Judge Hardwicke, would you like to weigh in on that one?
(To Judge Schoenbaum) I'll give you a chance. Write it down.
JUDGE HARDWICKE: The idea that agencies have policies,
well-conceived distinct policies, which they follow in furtherance of
their mission, is a misconception. Most agencies don't have welldefined policies. And what policies they do have may be developed
as they go along. Now, it is true that the policy of, say, the Motor
Vehicle Administration is, "let's get the drunks off the highway."
And the judges that hear those cases know that's the policy. But our
cause is not the substantive mission. Our cause is due process. Our
goal is to decide the case fairly, in accordance with those principles.
We are not interested in defeating the mission. We are interested in
making sure that the mission is carried out in accordance with
constitutional prerogatives.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER:
weigh in?

Professor Rossi, do you care to

PROFESSOR ROSSI: Again, I think that AL determinations on
issues of regulatory policy are most difficult. It may well be that
there some agencies - certainly agencies, even in Maryland, such as a
state Department of Environmental Protection, have policies and
interpret statutes under ambiguous grants of authority. Those
policies are influenced by changes in the administration in a state, as
well as by political influence and changes in science and technology.
I know that's true in my home state of Florida, where our Department
of Environmental Protection has taken very different positions on
important regulatory issues under different administrations. The
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extent to which this is the case may well just depend on a regulatory
agency and its subject matter. If you take a decision by an
environmental agency or a decision by an agency such as the Public
Service Commission, it seems to be that agencies like those could be
greatly influenced by political shifts and changes in expert
knowledge, whereas some other agencies like DMV, may be less
So I agree with Judge
likely to change positions frequently.
Hardwicke that the appropriateness of ALJ finality is largely a
function of the subject matter. It varies with regulatory complexity,
and to the extent a decision is intertwined with either science or
politics, or both, ALJ finality and judicial deference to an AU is less
appropriate, in my opinion.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: As a follow-up to the question of
inconsistencies, by Judge Schoenbaum, he asks of the inconsistency
of ALJ to AU, isn't it more likely that this results in different facts in
the record?
Professor Flanagan?
Obviously it could, but I'm
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN:
thinking more of those situations where the question is whether or
not a certain level of activity justifies a finding on some particular
point, or, how important is a particular factor in the analysis. If there
is a multi-factored analysis on a point, in my opinion, different
judges will accord different weight to the same factors. Whereas,
one of the functions of agency review is to make sure that similarly
situated individuals have similar results. One of the important
functions of sentencing guidelines, for example, was to reduce the
difference in sentencing among judges. My concern is that when
ALJs make their final decision, subject only to whether or not that
satisfies whatever the legal standards of review are, that different
judges will view the same question differently and there will be
different results.
The one example I can think of comes from Louisiana. In
Louisiana, the Commissioner of Insurance takes the position that if a
person is convicted of a felony that he will revoke the license. It
doesn't make any difference what the felony is. The ALJs take the
position that they will conduct a review to determine whether the
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felony is related to the trustworthiness of the broker or the agent.
Clearly, if you're an agent, you're much better off having the ALJ
making the decision than the agency. And there is no way that
anyone can anticipate how different ALJs will rule on this issue.
There is a real loss of consistency in this approach.
That question started - the
HON. TYRONE BUTLER:
discussion came from a Louisiana judgment. We want to move on.
I think this next question will take us on a different road to try to
cover all the points.
Professor Flanagan, the question is, wouldn't training ALJs in
agency policy provide appropriate expertise? Don't inconsistencies
exist among the judicial branch of judges? And, finally, doesn't the
AJ provide the fairest forum for the complaining party.
So the first question, won't training ALJs in agency policy
provide the appropriate expertise?
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: I think the answer is no. On
review, the agency has the institutional knowledge of the entire
agency available to it, and I don't think there is any way that a
particular individual can have that type of expertise. But, no, I don't
think training is sufficient. It's certainly not sufficient to do away
with all agency review.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER:
among judicial branch judges?

Secondly, do inconsistencies exist

That, however,
Absolutely.
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN:
doesn't seem to me to be an argument for accepting inconsistencies
among ALJs in administrative law, when the legislature has said that
the agency has special expertise.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: And, finally, doesn't the ALJ
provide the fairest forum for the complaining party? And this is from
Judge Greco in Chicago. The fairest forum for the complaining party,
in other words, we've been doing a lot of talk about the agency's
rights and the agency's position. What about the complaining party,
the individual that comes from outside, that doesn't know how -
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PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: Well, one purpose of the hearing is
to provide procedural due process to the individual. And central
panels help enormously in providing fair hearings. Moreover, the
ALJ's factual findings, in the vast majority of the cases are what they
are, and the agency accepts those in almost all of those cases. All
I'm saying is that agencies should have the opportunity to look at the
record as developed and have some ability and authority to review
those issues that are policy- oriented.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Professor Rossi?
comment on this question?

Do you care to

PROFESSOR ROSSI: No.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Judge Hardwicke?
JUDGE HARDWICKE: I think the policy positions of the
agencies should be put on the table at the hearing. One area that has
always bothered me a lot is that of penalties. And if you have a
polluter, for example, that has been a very bad apple, the local EPA
has had trouble with this person for years, and so on the fifth offense,
it seeks the maximum penalty, a fine of $50,000 a day and $50,000
I want the agency to come before the
for each offense.
judge,
and detail this record and recommend the
administrative law
fine and penalty. It seems to me that those policy concerns must be
put on the table and it is there that they must be dealt with. Give the
malfeasor the opportunity to respond and deal with it in that manner.
I think that's a far better and proper way to do it than by the in-house
agency commission head.
HON TYRONE BUTLER: From South Carolina. Can an
agency make policy in a decision or should they do it by regulation?
Professor Rossi?
PROFESSOR ROSSI: That's a good question. In Florida,
agencies have to make almost all their policy in the context of notice
and comment rulemaking, given that by statute we don't allow
agencies to announce new policies in the context of adjudicative
decisions or enforcement proceedings. Is that a good thing? Putting
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on my "what is best" hat, I'm not sure that's generally a good
approach for a state to take. To the extent that agencies need a
certain degree of flexibility in the implementation of regulatory
programs - and particularly sophisticated agencies, where the
stakeholders who are regulated are also very sophisticated and really
might have quite a bit of capacity to understand where the agency
might be going with the implementation of a new policy - such a rule
may work to ossify agency regulation rather than make it better. The
result will be less experimentation and less flexibility in regulatory
implementation, and I think that adjudication is a far superior
decision-making mode for pursing experimentation and flexibility.
Outside of states like Florida, which require rulemaking, I don't think
that regulation is the only context in which policy issues come up. It
comes up in the context of adjudication, as well, and it should, in my
opinion. In addition, mixed questions of fact and law or fact and
policy are routine in the adjudicative context, even in states such as
Florida which require rulemaking.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Professor Flanagan?
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: I agree, particularly with regard to
the sophisticated agencies and sophisticated and difficult problems.
It's much more likely that you will have identified a problem and
fully developed a record when you go through a hearing than when
you are trying to anticipate what all the problems are beforehand.
The basic justification for agency review is that sitting here today,
and drafting regulations, you simply can't anticipate the problems or
the responses that agencies will have after a full hearing.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Judge Hardwicke, would you care to
address that?
JUDGE HARDWICKE: There is no question but that there is the
loss of the opportunity of the agency to develop policy through the
hearing process. And that's something that has to be given up when
we take that power away from the agency. But I think it's a good
trade-off. I think that the citizen coming to a hearing needs to know
what the issues are and what the policy is before the hearing happens.
I distrust a situation where the policy problem is not brought up until
the hearing and decided by one of the litigants: As a matter of fact, I
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think my academic friends will agree that policy cannot be made in
the context of contested case hearings.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER:
Carolina.

That was Judge Kittrell, South

The question is: In state
Judge Mann, North Carolina.
adjudication of special education contested cases under federal law,
that's IDEA, why does the federal law prevent the adjudicator who
makes the final decision from being an employee of the state
department of education?
Would you care to tackle that, Professor Flanagan?
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: Obviously, that is one of the
justifications for central panels. There is no doubt that there is great
advantage in having the initial fact finder be someone separate from
the regulated entity. I don't think there's any problem with that. My
point is that once all the facts have been found, and they are more
complicated, more developed than what was known at the initial
decision, what justification is there for not having the agency review
all of the evidence and decide whether or not this is a case that has
been adequately dealt with under the law or regulations or whether
there is some reason why the policy or the law or the interpretation
ought to be changed?
One of the real questions, that I'm having a very difficult time
getting a handle on, is: how many cases involve policy issues of this
type? That is very difficult, and many AU cases in the state system
may not generate these policy issues, and in those instances there
may be some reason for saying it was just purely a factual decision,
and it might be appropriate for AU finality. And it is appropriate for
agencies to say we don't want this type of decision and hand it back.
I'm just saying that as a principle, AU finality across the board, as it
is in Louisiana and in South Carolina, has significant disadvantages
to administrative law.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER:
Carolina.

That's Judge Mann from [North]
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I have a question here from Professor Asimow, and it's an
interesting question. Is there a better case for ALJ finality in mass
justice situations where ALJs generally resolve only factual issues
and no policy questions? For example, why not abolish the use of
appeals counsel in Social Security, or give ALJs final decision
powers in unemployment insurance cases in the states?
Professor Rossi?
PROFESSOR ROSSI: It's an interesting suggestion. Yes, I
agree that there's a stronger case. Whether it's a convincing case, I
think, would depend a lot on the context or the nature of the factual
findings. I don't want to open up a whole new can of worms here,
but today we've tended to accept the premise that on issues of
credibility we ought to let the ALJs' findings of facts carry the day.
But if the issues are the kinds of issues that we consider mixed
questions - for instance, in the context of black lung disease, an
adjudicative decision may involve complex causation questions that
combine fact, law and policy - some of the same concerns I've raised
today may come up even in a mass adjudication context. To the
extent, the question is ultimately a "mixed" one, it begins to raise
issues of law and policy. If an agency has institutional competence
to make accountable decisions on such a matter, I do not know how
we can reconcile judicial deference to an ALJ's final decisions with
both expert and political notions of accountability in administrative
law.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Judge Hardwicke?
JUDGE HARDWICKE: I'm reminded of a famous statement of
Spiro Agnew. You remember him, a famous Marylander. He said,
"if you've seen one slum, you've seen them all." Such oversimplification may occur when executive agencies become hardened
in their cultural approach and fail to recognize their own bias.
Environmental agencies may become bogged down because of
contending citizens and manufacturing forces so that the hearing
responsibility may be better handled by a system of independent
hearers able to make decisions quickly and efficiently.
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HON. TYRONE BUTLER: This is from Judge Solomon. In the
non-finality models, aren't the same agencies that are parties before
the AL the same agencies that would review the decisions?
Professor Flanagan?
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: Yes. But that ignores a very
important issue. There is a very significant difference between what
the staff's position is and what the agency board or executive may
decide. There is some evidence that agency boards differ with the
staff position on particular issues. So I think that they are not
synonymous. I don't think that the leadership affirms the staff in all
cases. Second, it also seems to ignore the procedural protections in
the APA. That is, matters come up for agency review, not for a
complete de novo review, but they typically come up as appeals on
particular issues in the same way they come up in the judicial system.
So the boards or commissioners are faced with deciding a much
narrower issue, usually highly focused as a result of what has gone
on before. So it is not entirely accurate to say that the staff and the
agency are the same entity, when you are talking about what has been
presented in front of the ALJ and the decision that is being ultimately
made on review by the leadership.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Professor Rossi?
PROFESSOR ROSSI: I think Jim stressed a very important point
in 1 is comments - which we haven't discussed much here - which is
that agencies are procedurally constrained in certain ways by the
APA. For example, they have to give notice. They have to explain
their decisions. And those requirements - procedural requirements
and requirements of explanation - are subject to judicial review. So I
think that's something important to take and keep into account here.
Agencies themselves are not without constraint in their decisionmaking. The efficiency and procedural fairness provided by an ALJ,
is of course, are extremely important; but so are other APA
procedural protections, some of which may not apply at all in the
adjudicative context before an AU unless a state APA makes this
explicit - for example, does the definition of an "agency" in an APA
include a non-agency ALJ?. If we move too far towards finality in a
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central panel system, we could end up with even less procedural
protection than is afforded when the agency makes the final decision.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Judge Hardwicke?
JUDGE HARDWICKE: I know my academic friends are well
aware that ALJs must give reasoned decisions. We do not have the
luxury of some of our constitutional judges who may check a block Plaintiff, Defendant, Respondent, Guilty, Not Guilty. We must give
a reasoned decision in every respect to support each conclusion of
law. And I think that constraint gives a great deal of protection to the
agency, to the respondent and to the public.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: It's very interesting in all these
questions I've received, the ones I can read, none are addressed to
Judge Hardwicke. So I'm going to take this one that's not addressed
to anyone, and I'm going to ask the Judge to start the discussion on
this. Would an appellate tier of administrative review within a
central panel improve accountability and provide more consistent
policy? I don't think this means policy, it mean[s] consistent
decision-making.
What do you think, Judge Hardwicke?
JUDGE HARDWICKE:
question.

I'm not quite sure I understand the

HON. TYRONE BUTLER: There's no name on this.
HON. STEVEN TEATE: It was mine.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: By saying you write appellate tier of
administrative review - in other words, the finality of the final
decision by the ALJ would be subject to appellate review within the
central panel, in other words, another group of judges that would act
as appellate review. Would that improve accountability and provide
more consistent policy, and I think you've got some views on that
sort of thing. Would you like to share those?
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JUDGE HARDWICKE: Chris McNeil has written an article in
which he said that he thought the Chief Judge should be able to lay
policy down within the central panel agency. I do not agree. I think
the public would find this process suspect because outsiders who did
not participate in the hearing process, could make changes in the
decision. I think that the person who hears the case, who is in front
of the parties, I think that's the person who should make the decision.
I would not want a non-hearing judge in that agency to review the
decision and have input into the result.
I remember my experience as a practicing lawyer who used to
take cases to the agencies, including federal agencies, that I would
tell my clients, "You know, you're going to lose this case. The
agency is going to decide against you. We will participate in this
proceeding to find out what is going on, and then we'll go before a
real judge and get a decision."
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Professor Flanagan?
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: That raises a very interesting issue.
My concern with AU finality deals with consistency of
interpretations, and there has to be some mechanism to deal with that.
In this context, I point out that in South Carolina, our central panel
has a provision for en banc review of critical issues. It is a very
interesting procedure. What I raise is that it is an extremely difficult
thing to set up and do internally for several reasons what Judge
Hardwicke has said. The whole question of internal quality control
within central panels generates controversy, as we've seen, and I
don't think there is any solution or resolution on the issue of internal
quality control. All internal consistency controls are going to run
into those organizational problems. It is not that I don't think it is a
good idea. I have some questions about how to implement it at the
present time.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Professor Rossi?
PROFESSOR ROSSI: I think it could be a good idea in a large
central panel system. Ideally, such review would be limited to issues
of general procedure, and issues of law and policy. I do not think it
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should extend to issue of fact, outside of perhaps a clear error
standard.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Professor Rossi, this is addressed to
you, again something a little more geared to what we do every day.
Agencies can offer expert witnesses from the agency to provide
agency policy. Why does this not overcome your argument about
ALJs being generalists? Judicial court judges are also generalists.
PROFESSOR ROSSI: That's a good question, to the extent we
want to consider the agency adjudicative process the same as a trial
in the judicial branch. However, I think there is something distinct
and important about administrative adjudication that does not extend
to the traditional trial. What I think is distinct about administrative
adjudication is providing the final decision-maker - and ultimately
the final decision-maker here is potentially a court - a record that
includes a clear, crisp statement of the agency's policies and legal
determinations. Providing expert witnesses on issues of policy,
requiring them to prove up those things in the context of a hearing,
certainly helps the record, but it doesn't provide the appellate
reviewing court a crisp status quo that reflects the agency's political
judgment and technical judgment on those issues. That is paramount,
in my view, to preserving accountability in administrative law.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Judge Hardwicke?
JUDGE HARDWICKE: I agree with Professor Rossi's answer.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Professor Flanagan?
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: I'm not going to disagree.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: This question, I'll ask it, is if
inconsistent decisions of different ALJs are a problem, can't this be
dealt with through the promulgation of new regulations?
Is that the question?
UNIDENTIFIED: If you've got several inconsistent decisions,
why not promulgate a new regulation?
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HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Professor Flanagan?
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: There is a certain level of Hell that
Dante has set aside for those responsible for getting regulations
through the state legislature, in my view. I think it is extraordinarily
difficult to address issues through the regulatory process. By the
time you've identified and solved one, you've got ten more. So,
some can be, but I don't believe that the regulations are a particularly
effective way for providing consistency on such issues.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Judge Hardwicke, how do you feel
about it?
JUDGE HARDWICKE: I think it can be solved by publication
of the Federal Register, whatever the publication or document is, I
do think so. But I do understand the response that the Professor
makes - that it's somewhat difficult. But, of course, you know, we
have things like the Skidmore decision where you can have internal
memoranda which do have some weight as to what the agency's
policy is. And I think our judges would pay attention to a Skidmore
type memorandum that would instruct the judges on what the agency
wanted, so that the public would be aware of the memorandum, and
we would not have to go through the formality of a published
regulation.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Professor Rossi?
PROFESSOR ROSSI: There is an interesting irony here that the
ALJ might be able to issue final decisions on issues of law that could
constrain the agency's authority. Suppose an AU makes a finding in
the context of a final adjudicative order that the agency doesn't have
the authority to do something like adopt a rule. My view would be
the agency should be able to come back and have to promulgate a
rule. The agency's legal interpretation should override the ALJ's in
that context, so long as an APA allows this. I'm not sure if that's
where you're intending to go with the question.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: If ALl decision-making is afforded
finality, can consistency and predictability be assured by measures
that would not affect the independence of the decision-maker?
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Judge Hardwicke?
JUDGE HARDWICKE: I'm not quite sure I understand the
question. Do you want to rephrase it?
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Judge Sharkey?
JUDGE SHARKEY: If in a central panel setting, where there is
finality of decisions, but there is a decision to insure consistency,
predictability of decisions so that to overcome the problem we've
been discussing, are there specific measures or programs, et cetera,
that would accomplish that, that would be consistent with the
principle of independent decision-making?
JUDGE HARDWICKE: There should be an index of decisions
within the agency so that when a judge has a particular question, that
judge should be able to see how some other judge decided that case.
We consider those other decisions to be persuasive, and frequently
the lawyers appearing before us would cite those other cases. The
judges would consider how those cases were decided. To answer
your question, yes, there should be such a system.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER:
respond to that?

Professor Rossi, how would you

PROFESSOR ROSSI: Yes, I think there ought to be such a
system of legal precedents to the administrative judiciary. The
administrative judiciary begins in many states with the advantage of
having written opinions, as trial courts frequently lack.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: We're coming down to almost the
end here, and we have a few questions left. This is from Judge
McDaniel, Louisiana, regarding political accountability. Which, on
balance, is more important to protect: political accountability, or the
right to a due process hearing when private property is at stake?
That's a loaded question.
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN: Political accountability means that
the agency has to be responsible to the appropriate political authority
for the broad policy direction and the results the agency achieves.
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That is democracy. That is why we elect legislators. The agency has
to be responsible that way. Does that mean that the trade-off is no
procedural due process or fairness to the individual litigant? No, I
don't think so. The AJ finds the facts, establishes the record,
develops an interpretation of the law, and to the extent that the
interpretation of the law is consistent with the direction the agency is
going, and what the agency has done in the past, that it will be
accepted by the agency. If there is a change by the agency, then the
question is whether the agency made the change consistently with the
laws. Is there a basis in the record, subject to judicial review, for
what it has done? So the due process comes at that point at the
judicial level. The agency has got to conform to whatever those
standards are.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Judge Hardwicke, do you agree?
JUDGE HARDWICKE: Judge Mann told me that I would have
to read something from The Federalist, so I'll read you the first
sentence of Madison, in Federalist No. 48, on the separation of
power Madison says: "It was shown in the last paper that the
political apothegm there examined does not require that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly
unconnected with each other. I shall undertake, in the next place, to
show that unless these departments be so far connected and blended
as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree
of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free
government, can never in practice be duly maintained."
In other words, if there is a blend of responsibility of the political
power that's assigned to one department, it is not necessarily
exclusive of responsibility to other departments.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Professor Rossi?
PROFESSOR ROSSI: I agree.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: We have five minutes to go, and
we'll have one more question, and let's see who the winner is here.
(Pause) Okay, this is from Judge Patrick Woodard, ALJ, Georgia.
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Professors, wouldn't their concerns be properly addressed if ALJs
issuing final decisions (a) were assigned cases based on expertise and
experience, so generalist concern is lessened, and [b] internal review
process at central panels insure procedural and substantive
correctness of final decisions?
I think we somewhat touched on that area a little today. I guess
I'll ask Professor Rossi if he cares to add any more to that.
PROFESSOR ROSSI: Sure. To take the second part first, in my
opinion on issues of law and policy the notion of "correctness" is the
wrong term to use in evaluating the decision. To the extent that
there's a range of permissible interpretations in the statute - for
example to the extent that there's a range of permissible models that
might be used in understanding an environmental program - deciding
the correct one should not be a non-agency adjudicator's role unless
there is specific statutory regulatory criteria that ought to be applied
to that question. But I agree that a lot can be gained through internal
review within a central panel. I just would not want to see us set out
to design a review system with the purpose of finding the "correct"
policy or legal decision. Not even courts review their role in this
manner where grants of authority to agencies are ambiguous.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Professor Flanagan?
I think it is a question of
PROFESSOR FLANAGAN:
legitimacy. The legislature has given the agency the authority to
make that decision and then committed the enforcement scheme to
that agency. Any time you have two different people looking at the
same thing, there are going to be differences in the results. So, I
don't think that compared to the agency, that the ALJ should have the
final decision on all those issues. In my view, there should be some
agency review.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Judge Hardwicke?
JUDGE HARDWICKE: I disagree.
HON. TYRONE BUTLER: Final word. Thank you very much.

